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IS THERE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR SKIING 
ON FILLED WETLANDS? INTERPRETING 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462 AFTER UNITED STATES V. TELLURIDE CO. 
Peter G. Brassard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of the Clean Water Act! (CWA) is to "restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."2 The CWA is the primary vehicle through which the 
federal government can regulate and protect wetlands,3 as well as 
institute and enforce national pollution control standards.4 
The two agencies vested with the power to enforce the CWA with 
respect to wetlands are the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(ACOE).5 Through the CWA, Congress empowered the Administra-
tor of the EPA to establish and enforce national effluent standards 
regarding the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States, 
including wetlands.6 Similarly, section 404 of the CWA empowers the 
Secretary of the Army to issue permits for the discharge of dredged 
* Editor-in-Chief, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
133 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
2 Id. § 1251(a). 
3Id. § 1344; Bhavani P.V. Nerikar, Comment, This Wetland is Your Land, This Wetland is My 
Land: Section J,OJ, of the Clean Water Act and Its Impact on the Private Development of 
Wetlands, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 197,200 (1990); Mark C. Rouvalis, Comment, Restoration of Wetlands 
Under Section J,OJ, of the Clean Water Act: An Analytical Synthesis of Statutory and Case 
Law Principles, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 295, 298 (1988). 
4 CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319, 1342. 
5Id. §§ 1251(d), 1344. 
6 Id. §§ 1311, 1319. 
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or fill materials into waters of the United States, including wetlands.7 
Both the Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary of the Army 
possess the ability to commence a civil enforcement action against one 
who is conducting CWA-regulated activity without a permit or in 
violation of the terms or conditions of a permit.8 
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, how-
ever, in the case of United States v. Telluride Co., has placed in doubt 
the ability of both the ACOE and the EPA to fulfill their objectives 
under the CWA.9 Telluride concerned an action by the EPA against 
Telluride Company for the filling of sixty acres of wetlands without a 
permit.lO The court narrowly interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the general 
five-year statute of limitations used for CWA violations, holding that 
the statutory period begins to run at the time of the dischargeY The 
court's narrow interpretation of § 2462 not only threatens to frustrate 
effective enforcement of the CWA, but also threatens the future of 
America's wetlands. If the Telluride decision remains good law, the 
government will lose the opportunity and ability to prosecute claims 
that could not be reasonably discovered within the statutory period.12 
This Comment examines the Telluride case in light of the relevant 
tolling and accrual doctrines generally employed in statutes of limita-
tions cases, namely, the continuing violation theory and the discovery 
rule.13 Upon a review of the doctrines, this Comment suggests that 
courts must continue to employ one of these two doctrines when 
applying the CWNs statute of limitations. Only through application of 
one of the doctrines-both of which are logical and fair-can courts 
ensure sufficient protection of our nation's wetlands. 
Section II of this Comment provides background to statutes of limi-
tations, including their history, purposes, commencement, and tolling. 
Section II also presents a brief overview of federal courts' borrowing 
of state statutes of limitations and a description of § 2462-the federal 
statute of limitations for civil penalty actions. Sections III and IV 
discuss the two doctrines often cited by plaintiffs in statutes of limi-
tations issues-namely, the continuing violation theory and the dis-
covery rule. Section V describes the Telluride case, examining the 
7 [d. § 1344. 
8 [d. §§ 1319(a)(I)-(2), 1344(s). 
9 See generally United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995). 
10 [d. at 405. 
11 See id. at 408. 
12 See infra section IV. 
13 See infra notes 80-87 (definition of continuing violation theory) and notes 125-33 (definition 
of discovery rule) and accompanying text. 
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arguments regarding statutes of limitations and the court's choice of 
the actual date of violation as the time the statute of limitations began 
to run. Finally, section VI considers the continuing violation theory 
and the discovery rule in light of the Telluride case, concluding with 
the suggestion that either of the two theories provides the govern-
ment with an opportunity to preserve America's wetlands without 
infringing on the functions and purposes of statutes of limitations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutes Of Limitations 
Statutes of limitations first appeared in English law as early as 
1236.14 The purpose of these early English statutes of limitations, and 
subsequent ones, was to prohibit real property actions that had oc-
curred before a fixed date, such as the coronation of Henry 11.15 
Like their predecessors, the function of today's statutes of limita-
tions is to establish a time at which a party can no longer bring an 
action or suit in law or equity.16 Establishing such a time limit requires 
"parties to settle their business matters within certain reasonable 
periods."17 Black's Law Dictionary defines a statute of limitations as: 
[a] statute prescribing limitations to the right of action on certain 
described causes of action or criminal prosecutions; that is, declar-
ing that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor 
any criminal charge be made, unless brought within a specified 
period of time after the right accrued.18 
At common law, no time limits exist within which a party must bring 
an action, thus, any time limit placed on a legal action is the result of 
statutory enactment.19 
14 Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1,177, 1,177 (1950) 
[hereinafter Developments]. 
15 See id. 
16 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2 (1987). 
17 Robert Muscara, Note, Tort Law-Federal Tort Claims Act-Accrual of Medical Malprac-
tice Action-United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), 4 w. NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 157 
(1981) (quoting H. WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTION 8 (2d ed. 1893)). 
18 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). Statutes of limitations also are defined as: 
[s ]tatutes of the federal government and various states setting maximum time periods 
during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced. After the time period 
set out in the applicable statute of limitations has run, no legal action can be brought 
regardless of whether any cause of action ever existed. 
Id. 
19Jean P. Hannig, Note, Limitation of Actions-Ignorance of Cause of Action-Medical 
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B. Purposes of Statutes of Limitations 
Three basic policies behind statutes of limitations often are cited by 
courts and scholars: fairness to the defendant, judicial effectiveness, 
and stability and consistency.2o First and foremost, statutes of limita-
tions prevent a defendant from being vulnerable to the threat of a 
legal action indefinitely.21 Statutes of limitations enable the defendant 
to rest assured that "the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obliga-
tions,"22 and that he or she can avoid bad claims the defendant other-
wise could refute successfully if evidence and witnesses had been 
available.23 Moreover, even if the claims are "good,"24 statutes of limi-
tations relieve the defendant from the burden of defending, and courts 
of trying, "stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights."25 
In addition, statutes of limitations, by encouraging the prompt 
presentment of claims, ensure that courts remain efficient.26 Stat-
utes of limitations are "practical and pragmatic devices to spare the 
courts" of old or stale litigation.27 In other words, statutes of limita-
tions relieve courts of the duty to "adjudicat[e] inconsequential or 
tenuous claims,"28 particularly when "evidence has been lost, memo-
ries have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."29 
Finally, statutes of limitations help bring stability and consistency, 
as well as public convenience, to the parties of much of commercial 
intercourse and trade, including property transactions.30 Specifically, 
statutes of limitations ensure security on the part of a landowner with 
respect to both the possession and alienation of land.31 In sum, the 
purposes behind statutes of limitations are important in cases where the 
Malpractice Claim Accrues When Plaintiff Discovers Defendant's Possible Negligence, 60 N.D. 
L. REV. 295, 296 (1984); Muscara, supra note 17, at 158. 
20 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964); 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 
1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 130, 133-34 (1955); Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185-86; Carrie G. McKinney, Note, 
Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 195, 
202-03 (1986). 
21 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185; McKinney, supra note 20, at 202. 
22 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185. 
23 See Callahan, supra note 20, at 133-34. 
24 I d. at 134. 
25 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964). 
26 See Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185. 
27 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 896 (1945). 
28 See Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185. 
29 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
30 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,185-86. 
31Id. at 1,186. 
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interpretation of the statute is critical because the purposes influence how 
a court or legislature will determine when the statutory period accrues. 
C. Commencement and Suspension of Statutes of Limitations 
Generally, statutes of limitations begin to run when the cause of 
action accrues32 or arises,33 when the right to institute and maintain a 
suit arises,34 or when there is a demand capable of present enforce-
ment.35 The statutory period begins either when the defendant com-
mits a wrongful act or when the plaintiff suffers substantial harm or 
injury.36 When those two events are not simultaneous, courts gener-
ally look to the substantive elements of the case to determine whether 
the statute began to run with respect to the former or the latter 
event.37 If a defendant's conduct constitutes an invasion of a plaintiff's 
rights such that the same plaintiff could maintain suit regardless of 
damage, the statute begins to run when the conduct is complete.38 
Where injury or harm is the focal point of the action, however, the 
occurrence of the harm determines the commencement of the statu-
tory period.39 
Circumstances may arise, however, that suspend or interrupt the 
running of the statute of limitations by temporarily nUllifying a cause 
of action until the occurrence of some additional fact.40 For instance, 
a defendant might prevent or hinder suit, thereby postponing the 
start of the statutory period, through fraudulent concealment or ab-
sence from jurisdiction.41 "Ordinarily the acts of concealment must 
consist of affirmative misrepresentation or active conduct, but inac-
tion or nondisclosure is sufficient if there exists a relationship of a 
fiduciary nature, sufficiently close to impose an affirmative duty of 
disclosure."42 In some instances, however, innocent misrepresenta-
tions or misleading conduct amounting to "constructive fraud" have 
been held sufficient to employ the concealment exception.43 
32 Id. at 1,200; Muscara, supra note 17, at 158. 
33 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 81 (1987). 
34 Muscara, supra note 17, at 158; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 8l. 
35 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 8l. 
36 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,200. 
37Id. 
38 Id. at 1,200-0l. 
39 Id. at 1,20l. 
40 Id. at 1,220; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 85-92 (1987); see also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1,488 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of "toll"). 
41 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,220-22, 1,224-26. 
42 Id. at 1,22l. 
43 Id. 
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In a different context, the infancy, insanity, imprisonment, or death 
of a plaintiff also are recognized as exceptions to the commencement 
or continuation of the statutory period.44 Often a statute oflimitations 
does not commence until the plaintiff's disability ceases.45 Regardless 
of whose conduct or status to which the circumstances relate, a plain-
tiff generally bears the burden of proving that the running of the 
statutory period should be tolled.46 
D. The Borrowing of State Statutes of Limitations in Federal 
Court and the Creation of § 2462, the Federal Statute of 
Limitations for Civil Penalties 
Generally, where a federal law or cause of action created by Con-
gress does not contain an express statute of limitations, courts infer 
"that Congress intended that a local time limitation should apply."47 
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, however, the United 
States Supreme Court warned that state limitations periods are not 
"our exclusive guide," and that courts should not apply mechanically 
a state statute of limitations because the federal law lacks an express 
limitations period.48 Rather, the Court noted, where a state statute of 
limitations would inhibit enforcement of a federal law, courts do not 
need to borrow from state law.49 The Court reasoned that state legis-
lators generally do not create statutes of limitations with national 
interests in mind, and thus a federal court should not employ a state 
statute of limitations if it would "frustrate or interfere with the im-
plementation of national policies."50 Congress resolved the problems 
behind borrowing state statutes of limitations in 1948 with the enact-
ment of 28 U .S.C. § 2462, the default federal statute of limitations for 
civil penalties matters.51 
The general federal statute of limitations reads, in relevant part: 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or 
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced 
44 [d. at 1,229-33. 
45 [d. at 1,229. 
46 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,220. 
47 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); accord Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179--82 (1976). 
48 Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367. 
49 [d. 
50 [d. 
51 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994). 
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within five years from the date when the claim first accrued .... "52 
Section 2462 serves as a "catch-all" statute of limitations for those 
federal statutes, including the CWA, that specifically do not contain a 
statute of limitations.53 This five-year statute of limitations applies to 
all penalty and forfeiture claims the government brings under the 
CWA.54 
Although courts generally have limited § 2462 to apply only to 
actions on behalf of the United States,55 some federal courts have held 
that citizen enforcement actions, which are brought under the author-
ity of section 505 of the CWA,56 also are subject to the five-year 
limitations period under § 2462.57 Courts reason that because plaintiffs 
in citizen enforcement actions are acting effectively as private attor-
neys general, and because their suits are adjunct to the government's 
suits, they should be subject to the same limitations period as the 
government.58 Likewise, in the event a state statute of limitations is 
shorter than § 2462, citizen plaintiffs "would be handicapped in their 
ability to act as effective private attorneys general."59 Moreover, em-
ploying state statutes of limitations for such actions would raise prob-
lems of uniformity in enforcing the CWA from state to state, thereby 
leading to confusion and diminishing effective CWA enforcement.6o 
Congress's ambiguous language in § 2462, however, has led to in-
consistent interpretation and implementation of § 2462 in the context 
of a variety of federal laws.61 For example, in United States v. Core 
52Id. 
53 Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 17 
(D.D.C. 1995). 
54 United States v. Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United 
States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1408--09 (E.D. Va. 1990); McKinney, supra note 20, at 205. 
55 McKinney, supra note 20, at 205-06. 
56 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
57 Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 
(3d Cir. 1990), cen. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 
1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987). 
58 Public Interest Research Group of N.J., 913 F.2d at 74; Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 1522. 
59 Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 1522. 
6°Id. 
6! Compare United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding in action 
under Export Administration Act that the § 2462 limitations period accrues at time of under-
lying violation and not tolled during administrative proceedings) with United States v. Meyer, 
808 F.2d 912, 922 (1st Cir. 1987) (held in action under Export Administration Act that § 2462 
limitations period was tolled during administrative proceedings); compare also United States 
v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 408 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding in action under CWA for 
unpermitted filling of wetlands that § 2462 limitations period accrues at time of discharge) with 
Sasser v. Administrator, EPA, 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding in action under CWA 
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Laboratories, Inc. 62 and United States v. Meyer,63 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit construed § 2462 with respect to the 
Export Administration Act64 (EAA) in conflicting ways.65 Specifically, 
these two cases revolved around the interpretation of the phrase in 
§ 2462-"date when the claim first accrued."66 Interpretation of this 
phrase would determine when the statute of limitations began to run, 
and thus whether the government could litigate the action in each 
case.67 
In United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the statute accrued at the 
time of the violation, not when the government concluded its admin-
istrative proceedings.68 The court reasoned that using the latter point 
in time effectively would destroy any reason or purpose of the stat-
ute.69 The Fifth Circuit supported its holding by citing legislative 
history which stated that "the time is reckoned from the commission 
of the act giving rise to the liability .... "70 In short, the Fifth Circuit 
held that, in light of congressional intent and the right of a defendant 
to be free of stale claims for purposes of the EAA, the statute of 
limitations accrued at the time of the underlying violation.71 
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit in United States v. Meyer, held that if the government brought 
the administrative proceeding within the limitations period, it would 
have an additional five years during which to file a civil suit to enforce 
the administrative penalty.72 The court reasoned that a claim for en-
forcement of an administrative penalty could not "possibly accrue 
until there was a penalty to be enforced."73 
for unpermitted wetlands fill violation that the § 2462 limitations period is tolled as the discharge 
constitutes a continuing violation). 
62 759 F.2d 480. 
63 808 F.2d 912. 
64 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
65 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 922; Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 483. 
66 Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914; Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 481; see 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
67 See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914; Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 481. 
68 Core Lab., 759 F.2d at 483. 
69 See id. 
7°Id. at 482. 
71Id. at 483. 
72 United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914, 922 (lst Cir. 1987). 
73 Id. at 914. 
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The First Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's emphasis on the leg-
islative history of the EAA amendments in its interpretation of § 2462, 
finding the committee reports that the Fifth Circuit cited to be noth-
ing more than "legislative dictum."74 The First Circuit held that the 
language, "until the date when the claim first accrued," in the context 
of the EAA, implied that a claim only can accrue after the adminis-
trative proceeding has ended "and a final [administrative] decision has 
resulted."75 The court reasoned that too much of the timing of a case 
is largely beyond the government's control. 76 Moreover, if the Fifth 
Circuit's interpretation were left to stand-that the statute accrues 
at the time of the violation77-suspected violators could drag out the 
administrative process intentionally and employ stalling techniques 
to preclude any enforcement proceedings.78 
In sum, federal courts have reached conflicting results when inter-
preting § 2462 in the EAA context. Such conflict over § 2462, how-
ever, is not restricted to the EAA. Rather, courts applying § 2462 to 
CWA violations also have reached conflicting results. The source of 
that conflict, as seen in United States v. Telluride CO.79 and other 
federal cases, is two commonly used doctrines to toll statutes of limi-
tations-namely, the continuing violation theory and the discovery rule. 
III. THE CONTINUING VIOLATION THEORY 
Plaintiffs often invoke the continuing violation theory in statutes of 
limitations issues, including § 2462 matters, as a way to challenge the 
accrual of the statutory period.80 The continuing violation theory does 
not, however, interpret the statute of limitations at all.81 Rather, the 
continuing violation theory is an attempt to establish a different start-
ing point for the tolling of statutes of limitations like that in § 2462.82 
Although some courts have held that a claim to redress a continuous 
74 [d. at 915. 
75 [d. at 922. 
76 See id. at 919. 
77 See United States v. Core Lab., Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985). 
78 Meyer, 808 F.2d at 919. 
79 884 F. Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995). 
80 See, e.g., Sasser v. Administrator, EPA, 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Reaves, No. 94-925-Civ-J-20 1,6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 1996); North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. 
Army Dep't, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941, 1943 (E.D.N.C. 1989) [hereinafter NCWF]. 
81 See Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129; Reaves, No. 94-925-Civ-J-20 at 6; NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) at 1943. 
82 See Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129; Reaves, No. 941-925-Civ-J-20 at 6; NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) at 1943. 
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wrong accrues on the date of the last wrongful or injurious act,83 other 
courts have held that, where a cause of action is based on several acts 
occurring over an extended period, the cause of action accrues with 
each act, or at least not until the injury is permanent.84 
Under the continuing violation theory in the CWA context, each 
day a pollutant or discharge of dredged or fill material remains in 
navigable waters of the United States, including wetlands, amounts 
to a continuing violation.85 So long as the unpermitted material re-
mains in wetlands, a new violation results: restarting the clock and 
thereby effectively tolling the statute of limitations.86 Thus, in CWA 
enforcement actions under the continuing violation theory, the statute 
of limitations, for purposes of administering an enforcement or civil 
penalty, does not begin to run or accrue until the fill physically is 
removed.87 
In North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Army Department [here-
inafter NCWF] , the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina held that the continuing violation theory 
was a "reasonable" argument to assert in statute of limitations cases, 
including CWA enforcement actions.88 In NCWF, the government 
charged the private defendants with violating the CWA during con-
struction of drainage ditches and canals for a large-scale peat mining 
operation.89 During construction, the defendants allegedly drained 
some wetlands and filled other wetlands-both constituting illegal 
actions under the CWA.9Q 
The ACOE decided, after a site inspection, that the majority of the 
property was not subject to the CWA because the property had lost 
its wetlands character due to the private defendants' ditching and 
drainage.91 Subsequently, NCWF (along with the Sierra Club and 
83 Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1980), eert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981). 
84 Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (D. Kan. 1977). 
85 See Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129; United States v. Key West Towers, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 963, 964 
n.l (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 700 (D. N.J. 1987); United States 
v. Cumberland Farms of Conn., Inc., 647 F. Supp.1166, 1183 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 
(1st Cir. 1987), em. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). 
86 See Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129; Key West Towers, 720 F. Supp. at 964 n.l; Ciampitti, 669 F. 
Supp. at 700; Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1183. 
ffl See Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129; Key West Towers, 720 F. Supp. at 964 n.l; Ciampitti, 669 F. 
Supp. at 700; Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1183. 
88 NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941, 1943 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
89 [d. at 1942. The activities in question occurred on 7,500 acres in North Carolina during the 
years 1979-82. [d. 
00 [d. 
91 [d. 
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others) brought suit against the private defendants, the ACOE, and 
the EPA to enforce compliance with the CWA.92 The private defen-
dants moved for summary judgment on subject matter jurisdiction 
and statute of limitations grounds.93 
Denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court 
held that, in failing to remove the illegal fill material from the wet-
lands between the last day of actual discharge and the date of the 
filing of the complaint, the defendants continually had violated the 
statute.94 The court reasoned that application of the continuing viola-
tion theory, narrowly applied to only those unpermitted activities that 
were correctable or susceptible to remedial efforts, was justified in 
that it served to ensure effective enforcement of and promote the 
purposes of the CWA.95 The court stated that holding otherwise would 
give violators a "powerful incentive" to do all that was possible to 
conceal any remediable illegal or unpermitted wetlands activity from 
public and private scrutiny.96 
Moreover, the court held that the defendants' failure to take reme-
dial measures constituted a continuing violation.97 Arguing in dicta 
that "to be in violation," as defined in the CWA,98 suggests "a state, 
rather than an act-the opposite of [a] state of compliance," the court 
implied that although the act of discharging had passed, the presence 
of the illegal fill in wetlands constituted a continuing violation of the 
CWA in and of itself.99 Simply the presence of the fill remaining in 
wetlands constituted a violation, distinct from the physical discharge 
of the fill materials.10o 
Courts also have adhered to the continuing violation theory in 
another environmental context. Specifically, courts have employed the 
continuing violation theory when enforcing section 10 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899.101 Judicial adoption of the continuing viola-
tion theory in the section 10 context is significant for proponents of 
92 Id. 
93 NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1942. 
94 Id. at 1943. 
95 See id. 
96 Id. 
97Id. 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
99 NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1943 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring». 
100 See id. 
101 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994). 
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that theory in the CWA context because of the similarity in the goals 
of these statutes. Section 10 is the other federal statute the ACOE 
enforces to protect the waters of the United States.102 
In United States v. Benton & Co., Inc., the ACOE alleged that the 
defendant had violated section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Actt03 
when it "did fill, alter, and modify" a navigable water of the United 
States without a permit or ACOE authorization.104 The ACOE con-
tended that the defendant committed acts in violation of section 10 
"[b]eginning at a time unknown and continuing until the date of this 
information."105 
In finding for the government, the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida, in Benton, reasoned that a "continuing 
offense" can consist of separate acts or a course of conduct that arise 
"from that singleness of thought, purpose or action, which may be 
deemed a single 'impulse."'106 By holding that violations under section 
10 are continuing in nature, the court ruled that for purposes of 
statutes of limitations, the indictment "need not allege the date of the 
commencement of the violation, but need only allege that the last act 
in the commission of the crime occurred within the statute of limita-
tions."107 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
followed a similar rationale in United States v. Reaves, a case that 
involved violations of both the CWA and the Rivers and Harbors 
Act.108 In the summer of 1981, Reaves excavated material from a creek 
abutting his property, creating a canal and filling approximately sev-
enteen acres of wetlands on his property.109 The government first 
became aware of the alleged violations on December 6, 1989, when an 
ACOE biologist conducted a site visit.no Following a subsequent cease 
and desist order, the ACOE filed its action on September 21, 1994.111 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 United States v. Benton & Co., 345 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
106 Id. at 1103. 
106 Id. (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952». 
107 Id. 
108 United States v. Reaves, No. 94-925-Civ-J-20 1,4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 1996) (order denying 
summary judgment). 
109 Id. at 4. 
l1°Id. at 4-5. The site in question is located in a remote, rural area in Nassau County, Florida. 
The sole access to the site is via a dead-end road, from which the alleged violation is not visible. 
Id. at 4. 
111 Id. at 5. 
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Reaves admitted that he discharged the materials into the wetlands 
without a permit or ACOE authorization in violation of section 301 of 
the CWA.ll2 Nevertheless, Reaves moved for summary judgment, 
alleging that the federal statute of limitations, § 2462, barred the 
government from litigating its civil action.u3 Reaves contended that 
the claim accrued in June of 1981, the date of the violation, more than 
thirteen years before the government filed the action in Federal 
District Court.U4 
The government, in rebuttal, argued that the action was not barred 
for any of three reasons, two of which are relevant to this Comment.U5 
The government argued Reaves's unlawful actions constituted a con-
tinuing violation such that so long as the illegal fill remained, the 
statutory period did not begin to run.ll6 In the alternative, the gov-
ernment argued that the statute of limitations did not accrue until it 
first knew, or had reason to know, of the alleged violation-namely, 
December 6, 1989.117 
Citing NCWF118 and Sasser v. Administrator, EPA,119 the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, in Reaves, 
found the continuing violation theory to be a viable theory with which 
to toll the statutory period.120 In its order, the court quoted as persua-
sive authority the Sasser decision which held that "[e]ach day the 
pollutant remains in the wetlands without a permit constitutes an 
additional day of violation."121 Similarly, the Reaves court held that 
Reaves's unpermitted discharges of dredged or fill materials would 
remain a continuing violation so long as the fill remained intact and 
thus the federal five-year statute of limitations had not yet accrued.l22 
In short, the continuing violation theory is an effective, legitimate 
tool for plaintiffs to use to toll a statute of limitations. Successful 
employment of the continuing violation theory enables a plaintiff to 
hold a defendant responsible for claims from which the defendant 
could otherwise hide or escape. The theory which claims greater 
112 [d. at 4. 
113 Reaves, No. 94-925-Civ-J-20 at 1,5. 
114 [d. at 5. 
115 [d. at 6. 
116 [d. 
117 [d. 
118 NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
119 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993). See infra note 256 for a full discussion of the Sasser decision. 
120 Reaves, No. 94-925-Civ-J-20 at 6-7. 
121 [d. at 7 (quoting Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129). 
122 [d. at 7-8. 
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application and acceptance in halting the accrual of the statutory 
period, however, is the discovery rule. 
IV. THE DISCOVERY RULE 
The date a statute of limitations begins to run or accrues always 
has been an oft-debated issue in the courtS.123 One way courts, usually 
at plaintiffs' behest, have attempted to decide this issue is through 
some form of the continuing violation theory.124 However, the way 
most federal jurisdictions have resolved the statute of limitations 
problem is through use of the discovery rule.125 Under the discovery 
rule, the statute of limitations accrues when the plaintiff knew of or 
discovered, or should have reasonably known of or discovered, the 
alleged injury or violation.126 A majority of jurisdictions have adopted 
the discovery rule by common law decision or statute in both private 
actions and claims involving the federal government.127 
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court adopted the discovery 
rule in Urie v. Thompson to determine when, under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act,128 a cause of action accrued.129 Since the Urie 
decision, use of the discovery rule has increased dramatically. Cases 
employing the discovery rule involve issues ranging from medical 
123 Muscara, supra note 17, at 155. 
124 See supra notes 90-125 and accompanying text. 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1993); 
United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (E.D. Va. 1990); Atlantic States Legal Found. 
v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287--88 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
126 See Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1139 (7th Cir. 1992); Hamilton v. 1st Source 
Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1990); Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 694; National Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263, 1277 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 16 F.3d 1395 (1993); 
Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. at 1410; Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 287--88. 
127 Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) (Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) case); Central States Pension Fund v. NAVCO, 3 F.3d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1062 (1994) (Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
(MPPAA) case); Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 
U.S. 951 (1993) (EEOC matter); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 
1992) (Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) matter); Jansen v. Snellings, 841 
F.2d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 1988) (RICO matter); Proudfoot v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 1558, 
1559 (11th Cir. 1986) (NLRA matter); Hamilton v. Cunnigham, 880 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (D. Colo. 
1995) (RICO case); Burkins v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 1480, 1492 (D. Colo. 1994) (FTCA 
claim); Flotech, Inc. v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours, Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 364 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'd, 
814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987) (product disparagement and defamation case); Wagner v. Allied 
Chern. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1407, 1408--09 (D. Md. 1985) (tort claim); United States v. Advanced 
Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (D. Minn. 1982) (Consumer Product Safety Act case); see 
Hannig, supra note 19, at 297. 
128 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). 
129 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949). 
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malpractice suits130 to § 1983 c1aimsl31 to age discrimination cases132 
and beyond.133 
A. Non-CWA Violations 
Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank involved a terminated employee, Ham-
ilton, suing his former employer, 1st Source Bank (1st Source), under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Actl34 (ADEA) for alleged 
discriminatory discharge and pay discrimination.135 In March 1980, 1st 
Source had hired Hamilton as a vice-president.136 Although Hamilton's 
base salary was increased in 1984, 1st Source nonetheless terminated 
Hamilton's employment on April 21, 1986 without forewarning for 
"Failure to Perform."137 
After filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) within the 180-day statutory period alleging 
discriminatory discharge because of age, Hamilton filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of North Caro-
lina in 1987.138 Pre-trial discovery in May 1987 revealed that Hamilton 
earned a salary far lower than younger executives in the same job 
category.139 As a result of this discovery, Hamilton filed an amended 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979); Espinoza v. United States, 715 
F. Supp. 207, 209 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
131 See, e.g., Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995); Gerritsen v. 
Consulado Gen. de Mex., 989 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir.), een. denied, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 95 
(1993); Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, 945 F.2d 317, 318-20 (9th Cir. 1991), eert. denied, 
504 U.S. 910 (1992); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (1994). 
132 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990), een. denied, 501 U.S. 
1261 (1991); Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 163-M (4th Cir. 1990). 
133 Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) (FTCA claim); Central States 
Pension Fund v. NAVCO, 3 F.3d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 
1062 (1994) (MPPAA case); Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1992), eert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993) (EEOC matter); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1140-41 
(7th Cir. 1992) (ERISA matter); Jansen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 1988) (RICO 
matter); Proudfoot v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 1558, 1559 (11th Cir. 1986) (NLRA matter); 
Hamilton v. Cunnigham, 880 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (D. Colo. 1995) (RICO case); Burkins v. United 
States, 865 F. Supp. 1480, 1492 (D. Colo. 1994) (FTCA claim); Flotech, Inc. v. E.!. DuPont de 
Nemours, Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 364 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'd, 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987) (product 
disparagement and defamation case); Wagner v. Allied Chern. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1407, 1408-09 
(D. Md. 1985) (tort claim); United States v. Advanced Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (D. 
Minn. 1982) (Consumer Product Safety Act case). 
134 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). 
135 Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 161. 
136 [d. 
137 [d. 
138 [d. 
139 [d. 
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complaint with both the EEOC and the District Court to include the 
additional charge against 1st Source of pay discrimination.140 
In its argument, 1st Source contended that Hamilton's pay discrimi-
nation claim was time-barred under § 626(d)141 of the ADEA.l42 Briefly 
stated, 1st Source argued that the 180-day period had begun to run 
on April 21, 1986, the date of discharge, and not, as Hamilton main-
tained, in May 1987 when Hamilton first became aware that younger 
executives were paid significantly higher salaries than he was paid.l43 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that proper construction of the statute of limitations in this case 
required application of the discovery rule. l44 The court held that the 
statutory period should not begin to run until a "reasonable plaintiff 
should have known facts that would support a charge of discrimina-
tion."145 Maintaining that the rule is reasonable in requiring the com-
plainant to be "reasonably prudent in exercising potential opportuni-
ties to discover putative discrimination," the Fourth Circuit held that 
Hamilton had filed his discrimination claim in a timely manner.146 The 
court reasoned that, because Hamilton's ADEA complaint was filed 
within the 180-day statutory period, and because he only became 
aware of the pay discrimination through pre-trial discovery of his 
original claim, the claim was not time-barred.147 According to the 
court, "Hamilton was not sitting idly by, allowing his claims to grow 
stale. In fact, he became aware of the pay discrimination when he did 
only because he acted expeditiously to protect his discriminatory 
discharge claim."148 Thus, the court recognized the discovery rule as 
a reasonable means with which to prevent accrual of the statutory 
period, provided the plaintiff can show that expecting earlier discov-
ery of the injury was unreasonable.149 
140 Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 161. 
141 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Section 626(d) states, in relevant part: "[n]o civil action may be com-
menced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful 
discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a 
charge shall be filed-(l) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred .... " [d. 
142 Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 1624i3. 
143 [d. at 163. 
144 [d. at 163-64. 
145 [d. at 164 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. O'Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 
393-94 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
146 [d. at 164--U5 
147 Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 164--U5. 
148 [d. at 165. 
149 See id. at 164--U5. 
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In short, unless the defendant can show that the plaintiff had rea-
sonable notice or opportunity to discover the violation, the statute of 
limitations will be tolled by the discovery rule. l50 In Hamilton, the 
court found that the plaintiff neither received any notice nor had the 
opportunity to reasonably discover the notice until the discovery 
phase of the trial, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run until that time.151 
In contrast, however, in Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, based on the facts 
of the case, found that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice such 
that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations.152 Tolle 
involved an employee bringing suit against her former employer for 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act153 (ERISA) benefits.l54 
On January 9, 1984, Carroll Touch, Inc. (CTI) executives informed 
Tolle and fellow employees that the company was taking specific 
measures to relocate from Illinois to Texas.155 Shortly thereafter, on 
September 19,1984, CTI informed Tolle that she would be terminated 
on October 19,1984.156 On September 24,1984, Tolle received a written 
memorandum confirming her termination.157 
After she received notice and prior to her termination, Tolle at-
tempted to obtain medical leave for her heart condition.l58 She was 
unable to obtain medical leave, however, because no doctor would 
certify her as being "disabled."159 As a result, CTI was able to termi-
nate Tolle and avoid providing employee benefits under section 510160 
ofERISA.161 Tolle filed her complaint on September 29,1989, and filed 
150 See id. at 164. 
151 [d. at 164-65. 
162 Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1140--41 (7th Cir. 1992). 
153 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). 
154 7blle, 977 F.2d at 1129. 
155 [d. at 1132. 
156 [d. 
157 [d. 
158 [d. Connie Tolle began working for Carroll Touch, Inc. (CTI) in 1978. At the time she was 
hired, Tolle informed CTI she had heart murmurs but the condition did not cause her problems. 
[d. at 1131. From 1980 to 1984 Tolle underwent examinations and subsequent treatment for her 
heart condition. [d. at 1131-32. 
159 7blle, 977 F.2d at 1132. 
160 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Section 1140 "is aimed at preventing persons and entities from taking 
various actions for the purpose of interfering with the participant's ability to collect benefits to 
which the participant would otherwise be entitled or from taking actions to prevent such a 
participant from collecting benefits to which he or she may become entitled." 7blle, 977 F.2d at 
1139. 
161 See Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1140. 
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an amended complaint on October 31,1989.162 CTI claimed that Tolle's 
ERISA claim was time-barred because she filed the complaint more 
than five years after her notification of discharge on September 24, 
1984.163 Thus, CTI claimed that the statutory period had expired five 
days prior to the filing of Tolle's first complaint.164 
Employing the discovery rule, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
decision to terminate and the "participant's discovery" of the decision 
dictated accrual.165 In other words, the statutory period began to run 
once CTI communicated its decision to Tolle.166 Thus, the court held 
that the statutory period began on September 19, 1984, or at least no 
later than September 24, 1984, when Tolle received written confirma-
tion, thereby time-barring Tolle's ERISA claim.167 The court reasoned 
that the September 24, 1984 letter "stated in unequivocal terms that 
[Tolle] would be terminated on October 19, 1984."168 As a result, this 
letter, "which left no room for contingencies," provided Tolle with 
sufficient notice such that the discovery rule was satisfied no later 
than September 24, 1984, when CTI made and clearly communicated 
its decision to terminate.169 
In short, both Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank and Tolle v. Carroll 
Touch, Inc. hold that the discovery rule is a reasonable theory with 
which to toll the relevant statute of limitations.17o Although the courts 
reach different results due to different facts, both courts nonetheless 
imply that some piece of documentation, some form of direct notice, 
is required to satisfy the discovery rule.171 Moreover, implicit in the 
discovery rule cases is that the rule does not undercut the policies 
behind statutes of limitations, including fairness to the defendant to 
be free of old claims.172 Courts' acceptance of this line of reasoning has 
162 [d. at 1132. 
163 [d. at 1138. The Seventh Circuit held that because Tolle alleged that CTI violated § 510 
when it terminated her so as to avoid paying her employee benefits to which she was entitled, 
the relevant date for accrual of the five-year statutory period under ERISA was the date of 
Tolle's termination. [d. at 1139-40. The question remained, however, whether the relevant date 
for accrual was the date of actual termination-October 19, 1984-or the date the termination 
was decided upon and communicated to Tolle-September 24, 1984. [d. at 1140. 
164 See id. at 1138. 
165 [d. at 1140-41. 
166 Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1141. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
170 Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 163-65 (4th Cir. 1990); Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1139. 
171 See Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1141; Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 164-65. 
172 See Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1138-41; Developments, supra note 14, at 1,200. 
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resulted in application of the discovery rule, not only in the context 
of ERISA or age discrimination claims, but in the CWA context as 
well. 
B. CWA Violations 
Although the discovery rule arises in a different context, it none-
theless similarly is employed and justified in CWA enforcement ac-
tions falling under the five-year limitations period of § 2462.173 Gener-
ally, courts hold that the statute of limitations does not accrue for 
CWA violations until the plaintiff knows of the violation or "through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered" the viola-
tion.174 Many courts reason that the discovery rule not only preserves 
some of the benefits and purposes of statutes of limitations, as the 
government cannot delay bringing actions against violators, but also 
prevents the public from being "harmed by an inability to prosecute 
claims for violations that could not reasonably have been discov-
ered."175 A rule that prevents the statute from running until the 
government has had a reasonable chance to become aware that the 
alleged violation has occurred-often through some form of written 
noticel76-preserves the purposes behind the CWA.177 
One case that followed this reasoning was Atlantic States Legal 
Foundation v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., a citizen suit filed by 
Atlantic States on July 30, 1984, alleging several violations of the 
CWA by the defendant.178 Defendant Al Tech had an EPA permit 
allowing it to discharge pollutants into the Kromma Kill, a small creek 
flowing into the Hudson River.179 Atlantic States contended that Al 
Tech had discharged pollutants between July 1977 and May 1983 at 
levels exceeding the terms and standards of the permit under which 
it was operating. ISO Although Al Tech itself was aware of occasionally 
173 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 824 F. Supp. 640, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1993); United States 
v. Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D. Ga. 1993); see 28 U.S.C. § 2462; Atlantic 
States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287--88 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
174 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695; accord ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646. 
175 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695; accord ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646. 
176 See Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
75 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646; United States 
v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (E.D. Va. 1990); Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 287. 
177 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 694; Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 287--88. 
178 Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 286. Al Tech operated a steel products manufacturing 
facility. [d. 
179 [d. 
180 [d. 
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exceeding the pennit standards, Atlantic States did not become aware 
of the alleged violations until reviewing reports that Al Tech submit-
ted to the EPA.181 
In its motion for summary judgment, Al Tech argued that Atlantic 
States was barred from litigating its pre-July 1979 claims due to the 
five-year statute of limitations applicable to CWA civil penalty cases.l82 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York agreed with Al Tech that § 2462 was the applicable statute of 
limitations for CWA violations.183 The court did not agree, however, 
that Atlantic States's claims prior to July 1979 were time-barred.184 
Implicitly employing the discovery rule, the Atlantic States court 
held that the statute of limitations did not accrue when the violations 
actually occurred, but rather when the reports filed by Al Tech with 
the EPA revealed the CWA violations.185 The court reasoned that, but 
for the reports, the public never would have been aware that the 
alleged violations had occurred.l86 The court stated that "[i]t would 
have been practically impossible for [Atlantic States] to have discov-
ered the alleged violations of [AI Tech] on its own."187 Moreover, the 
court held that if the statutory period were to begin to run when the 
violations actually occurred and not when they were discovered or 
could have been discovered, the remedial benefits of the CWA would 
be impeded or foreclosed.l86 In short, the Atlantic States court implied 
that to satisfy the discovery rule, some sort of notice is required.189 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at 287. 
183 Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 287. 
184 [d. 
185 See id. at 287--88. In a case similar to Atlantic States, United States v. Hobbs, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the five-year statutory period 
for purposes of a CWA violation does not accrue until reports that document violations are filed 
with the EPA and not when the violations actually occur. The court reasoned that such a holding 
was the only manner in which to preserve both effective enforcement of the statute and of its 
remedial benefits. United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1409-10 (E.D. Va. 1990). The court 
found that, although the EPA may have been alerted to the possible unpermitted discharges 
committed by the defendants during the years 1980--88, the statutory period did not begin to 
run until a biologist with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service filed a report with the 
EPA on December 12, 1988 recommending the ACOE issue a cease and desist order. [d. at 1410. 
Thus, although the government did not file its claims until June 1989, it was not barred from 
litigating its claims of CWA violations as far back as 1980. See id. The court reasoned that the 
government's cause of action accrued on the date of the filing of the report and not earlier 
because the report was the "first piece of information to formally detail and document the results 
of any field studies conducted on defendants' property." [d. 
186 Atlantic States, 635 F. Supp. at 287. 
187 [d. 
188 [d. at 288. 
189 See id. at 287-88. 
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia reached a similar result in United States v. Windward Properties, 
Inc., where the United States brought a civil enforcement action 
against Windward Properties, Inc. (Windward) for five alleged viola-
tions of the CWA.190 The government alleged that Windward had 
discharged dredged or fill material into three streams and their adja-
cent wetlands at Windward's real estate development in violation of 
sections 301 and 404 of the CWA.l91 Specifically, the government al-
leged that Windward committed these violations between 1979 and 
1982 during construction of a dam.192 
In moving for summary judgment, Windward argued that the gov-
ernment's action was barred, not only by the doctrine of laches, but 
also by the applicable statute of limitations, § 2462.193 Windward ar-
gued that the statutory period began no later than March 1982, the 
last period of alleged violation.194 On the other hand, the government 
contended that the statute of limitations did not accrue until the govern-
ment discovered Windward's unlawful activities.195 Thus, the govern-
ment argued, its cause of action filed February 14,1991, was timely.196 
The court, citing Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al Tech Spe-
cialty Steel COrp.,197 United States v. Hobbs,198 and NCWF/99 held that 
the discovery rule applied to this statute of limitations issue, and 
listed several policy arguments in favor of employing the objective 
rule in civil enforcement actions for wetlands violations.2°O The court 
found that implementation of the discovery rule, rather than a strict 
interpretation of § 2462, was proper.201 The court reasoned that the 
discovery rule would ensure that the purposes behind the CWA, as 
listed in sections 101(a) and 101(a)(2) of the CWA,202 would not be 
190 United States v. Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
191 [d. 
192 [d. 
193 [d.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
194 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 692. 
195 [d. at 693. 
196 [d. 
197 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
198 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990). See supra note 185 for a full discussion of the Hobbs 
decision. 
199 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). The NCWF court extended, in dicta, the 
Atlantic States rationale to dredge/fill violations, reasoning that the discovery rule "recognizes 
that it is virtually impossible for the public to discover violations until reports have been field 
[sic] with the EPA." [d. at 1944. 
200 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 694-95. 
201 [d. at 694; see 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
202 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)-{2). The sections state respectively, in relevant part: "[t]he objec-
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thwarted, including the purpose of protecting the many functions, 
values, and benefits wetlands bestow on both society and the environ-
ment.203 
Moreover, the court maintained that the discovery rule was neces-
sary for statute of limitations purposes because most fill violations are 
neither obvious nor easily detectable.204 Unlike other CWA violations 
where the government is on notice of discharges because of required 
permitting and reporting processes, most section 404 violations are 
not easily detectable because most violations occur without a permit 
or a report filed by the violator.205 Furthermore, once the fill has been 
discharged, some filled wetlands resemble uplands, and easily are 
overlooked.206 Thus, to ensur~ that the government has an opportu-
nity to prevent the purposes of the CWA from being frustrated, the 
court found the discovery rule reasonable.207 
Finally, the court noted that the discovery rule should apply to 
section 404 violations because the rule adequately balances the com-
peting interests of the government and the private defendant regard-
ing statutes of limitations issues.208 "U nder [the discovery] rule, many 
of the policy benefits of statutes of limitations are preserved as the 
Government cannot unreasonably delay in bringing an action, while 
the public is not harmed by an inability to prosecute claims for viola-
tions that could not reasonably have been discovered."209 
Applying its findings to the facts at hand, the Windward court, in 
denying summary judgment, found that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed.210 The court ruled that, although Windward might con-
vince the court that the government should have known of the alleged 
violation by showing a group of facts suggesting the government did 
in fact know of the violation, those same facts were not "sufficient" 
for the court to say, as a matter of law, that the government reason-
tive of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation's waters." [d. § 1251(a)(I). "It is the national goal that wherever attainable, an 
interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, 
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and ~n the water be achi~ved .... " [d. § 1251(a)(2). 
203 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 694. 
204 [d. at 695. 
205 [d.; see CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
206 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695. 
207 See id. 
208 [d.; see CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
209 Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695. 
210 [d. at 696. 
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ably should have known of the violation at issue prior to February 14, 
1986.211 
A third case that followed the discovery rule, albeit involving a 
different CWA violation, is United States v. Aluminum Company of 
America, a case in which the government sought civil penalties against 
the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) for 174 alleged viola-
tions of the CWA beginning in August of 1987.212 The government 
claimed to have become first aware of the CWA violations when 
ALCOA filed its Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) with the 
EPA on September 29,1987.213 The government filed its complaint on 
September 22, 1992.214 
ALCOA, in its motion for summary judgment, asserted that the 
claim accrued on the date of the actual violations, and thus the August 
1987 violations were time-barred by the five-year statute of limita-
tions.215 The government, on the other hand, maintained that the 
August 1987 violations were not time-barred because the statutory 
period began to run on the date the EPA received the DMRs from 
ALCOA-September 29, 1987.216 Citing the factually similar case of 
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, Inc.,217 the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas, in ALCOA, ruled for the government, holding that 
211 [d. The facts Windward alleged with regard to sufficient notice included a high degree of 
publicity surrounding construction of the lake and dam, the government's possession of aerial 
photographs of the site, and the existence of public records, including dam and construction 
permits. [d. 
212 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 824 F. Supp. 640, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1993). Although 
ALCOA had applied for and received a renewal for its NPDES permit, the government alleged 
ALCOA violated the CWA by discharging chemicals into a nearby ditch. [d. at 642-43. That 
discharge, which occurred during dismantling of the plant, was in excess of the standards 
established in the permit. [d. 
213 See id. at 643, 646-47. 
214 [d. at 644. 
215 [d. The date the statute of limitations began to run was a major issue because 129 of the 
alleged violations occurred in August 1987 but were not reported until September 1987. Thus, 
the date the court decided the statute of limitations accrued was of tremendous importance to 
both parties, as it would determine the defendant's potential level of liability. See id. 
216 [d. 
217 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). Powell Duffryn was charged with violating the limitations of its 
NPDES permit a total of 386 times over a period of six years. [d. at 68. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the statute of limitations did not begin to run at the time 
of discharge but when the defendant filed its DMRs, reasoning plaintiffs could never have 
reasonably been "deemed" to have known about the violations, since Powell Duffryn itself had 
the responsibility to monitor the effluent. [d. at 75. 
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the statute of limitations did not begin to run for purposes of the 
discovery rule until ALCOA had filed the DMRs.218 
The court rejected ALCOA's call to expand the discovery rule to 
encompass all evidence that the EPA knew or, through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have known of the violation.219 The court 
implicitly held that the statutory period only can accrue at the time 
the appropriate agency discovers the violation, namely, when the 
agency receives the statutorily mandated report.220 The court stated 
"[t]o hold otherwise ... would encourage the manufacturer to violate 
the reporting requirement and hide evidence ... until the five-year 
limitations period had run."221 Noting that statutes of limitations as-
serted as a defense against the government warrant a strict construc-
tion in favor of the government, the court found that ALCOA's cor-
respondence with the EPA did not suffice as notice sufficient to satisfy 
the discovery rule.222 
The court further reasoned that claiming that the EPA could have 
discovered the violation did not "correspond with reality," despite the 
fact that the EPA had the right to inspect and could have inspected 
the facility to test ALCOA's effluent discharge.223 The EPA simply did 
not possess the resources with which to monitor and inspect sites for 
potential violations.224 As the court noted, Congress recognized the 
EPA's limited resources when it drafted the CWA to require the 
permittee to monitor and submit reports for its own effluent dis-
charge.225 "To allow the permittee to benefit from the EPA's failure to 
inspect and immediately discover violations would frustrate the pur-
poses of the CW A."226 
Thus, although ALCOA speaks of the discovery rule from a differ-
ent CWA context than Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al Tech 
Specialty Steel COrp.227 or United States v. Windward Properties, 
Inc.,228 the end result is strikingly similar. The difficulties that both 
218 ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 645-46. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. at 646. 
223 ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 647. 
224 See id. Region VI, the EPA region where the case originated, received 14,270 DMRs each 
month, and with its limited resources could only inspect roughly 900 facilities per year out of 
nearly 5,600 permits. [d. 
225 [d. 
226 [d. 
227 635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
228 821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
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the government and public interest citizen groups face in discovering 
CWA violations mandates an interpretation of the discovery rule that 
requires a showing of some form of notice before the five-year statu-
tory period under § 2462 can accrue.229 Courts implicitly maintain that 
a notice requirement is consistent with the purpose and text of the 
discovery rule.230 The statutory period cannot begin to run unless the 
plaintiff knew of or discovered, or should have known of or reasonably 
discovered, the alleged injury or violation.231 Without an implied notice 
requirement, defendants too easily may impede the government's 
ability to protect wetlands.232 
Fortunately for the government and for other plaintiffs, the con-
tinuing violation theory is also an effective means of tolling the statute 
of limitations in some cases.233 The theory, which holds that for every 
day a pollutant or discharge of dredged or fill material remains in 
wetlands constitutes a continuing violation, is an excellent alternative 
in the event an action is time-barred by the discovery rule.234 
V. UNITED STATES v. TELLURIDE Co. 
Although the discovery rule never was raised in United States v. 
Telluride Co., the continuing violation theory was the central issue 
between the contending parties.235 In Telluride, the United States, 
through the EPA, brought a civil enforcement action pursuant to 
section 309 of the CWA236 seeking injunctive relief and civil penal-
ties against the Telluride Company, Mountain Village Company, Inc., 
and Telluride Ski Area, Inc. [hereinafter collectively referred to as 
TELCO].237 The United States alleged that TELCO, the developers of 
the Telluride ski resort in Telluride, Colorado, had violated the CWA 
at a land development property owned by TELCO.238 Specifically, the 
government stated that TELCO had discharged dredged or fill mate-
229 See Public Interest Research Group of N .J. v. Powell Duffryn Tenninals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
75 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646-47; Windward, 
821 F. Supp. at 695; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
230 See ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646; Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695. 
231 See ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 646; Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695. 
232 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287-88 
(N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
233 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
235 United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 406-08 (D. Colo. 1995). In Telluride, the 
EPA did not raise the issue of tolling under the discovery rule. 
236 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 
237 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 405. 
238 Id. 
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rials without a permit into wetlands on the property in violation of 
sections 301 and 404239 of the CWA.240 The government alleged that 
TELCO filled or caused to be filled over sixty acres of wetlands during 
a thirteen-year span from 1981 to 1994.241 
In September 1990, the EPA, in a meeting with TELCO's attor-
neys, brought forth its allegations of illegal fill activities.242 The meet-
ing resulted in a negotiated consent decree between the United States 
and TELCO in 1993.243 The United States filed its original complaint, 
along with a proposed consent decree, on October 15, 1993.244 After 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado rejected 
the proposed consent decree, the United States amended its com-
plaint and filed a revised amended complaint on October 7, 1994.245 
After answering the amended complaint, TELCO filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.246 TELCO 
asserted, pursuant to § 2462, that all claims based on the discharge of 
dredged or fill materials into wetlands that occurred before October 
15, 1988 were time-barred.247 TELCO argued that the five-year statu-
tory period began on the date the violation occurred and thus, given 
the filing date of October 15, 1993, all claims of violations prior to 
October 15, 1988 were precluded.248 Citing 3M Co. v. Browner,249 TELCO 
posited that the EPA had surrendered the opportunity to assess 
penalties against TE LCO for any violations allegedly committed more 
than five years before the EPA filed its original complaint.250 Accord-
ing to TELCO, the government's claims accrued at the time TELCO 
committed the alleged violations.251 
239 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344. 
240 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 405. 
241 [d. 
242 [d. 
243 [d. 
244 [d. 
245 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 405. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at 405--D6. 
248 [d.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
249 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See infra note 251 for a full discussion of the 3M Co. decision. 
250 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 406. 
251 [d. In the case cited by TELCO, 3M Co. v. Browner, 3M had filed a petition for review of 
the EPA's assessment of civil penalties for violations of the Toxic Substance Control Act 
(ToSCA). 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1454; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (1994). The EPA alleged 3M 
"unwittingly" had committed several ToSCA violations between August 1980 and July 1986. See 
3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1454. 3M had possessed and worked with two imported chemicals that were 
not on the EPA's inventory list of existing chemicals. [d. Section 5 of ToSCA requires the 
importer or manufacturer of a chemical to file the requisite notice and customs certificates 90 
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In opposition to TELCO, the United States argued that because a 
continuing violation existed, the statute of limitations had not yet 
begun to run.252 As a result, the United States argued it still could 
litigate all alleged violations committed by TELCO during the thir-
teen-year period.253 Relying on Sasser v. Administrator, EPA254 and 
NCWF,255 the EPA maintained that so long as the illegal, unpermitted 
fill remained and was not physically removed, the adverse effects of 
the discharged materials into waters of the United States constituted 
a continuing violation, and thus the five-year statute of limitations 
was tolled.256 
The Telluride court concluded that the unlawful discharge of pol-
lutants pursuant to section 301 of the CWA, for purposes of § 2462, 
did not constitute a continuing violation.257 Relying heavily on 3M Co. 
v. Browner, the court further held that the five-year statute of limi-
days before importing the chemical. ToSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1). The EPA subsequently filed 
an administrative complaint against 3M, seeking $1.3 million in civil penalties for 3M's failure to 
file Premanufacturer Notices as well as 3M's submission of inaccurate Customs Certificates for 
the two chemicals. 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 1455. 3M asserted a statute oflimitations defense arguing 
that, consistent with § 2462, the statute of limitations for ToSCA civil enforcement actions, all 
EPA claims for violations before September 1983 were barred. Id. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the running of the limitations period is 
measured from the date of the underlying violation. Id. at 1462. Thus, the EPA was precluded 
from prosecuting claims against 3M for alleged violations committed more than five years before 
the EPA filed its original administrative complaint. See id. 
252 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 406. 
253 See id. 
254 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993). 
255 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
256 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 406--07. In Sasser the defendant was charged with discharging 
pollutants without a permit into freshwater wetlands along his property in South Carolina in 
violation of § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, of the CWA. Sasser, 990 F.2d at 128. An administrative law 
judge imposed a $125,000 fine against Sasser. Id. at 129. 
In his defense, Sasser argued that the EPA lacked jurisdiction to assess civil penalties and 
that the only method of recovery for the EPA was through federal district court. Id. Dismissing 
Sasser's argument of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that Sasser's violation of the CWA was a continuing one. Id. The court 
stated that "[elach day the pollutant remains in the wetlands without a permit constitutes an 
additional day of violation." Id. 
Similarly, in NCWF, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina found that a continuing violation of § 301 of the CWA existed regardless of the six 
years that separated the last date of unpermitted discharge of dredged or fill material from the 
date of the filing of the complaint. NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1942-43. The court held 
that "[ w lhen a company has violated an effluent standard or limitation, it remains . . . 'in 
violation' of that standard or limitation so long as it has not put in place remedial measures that 
clearly eliminate the cause of the violation." Id. at 1943 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. 
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
257 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 408; see CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
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tations began to run at the time of the discharge, and thus the gov-
ernment could not assert any claims for alleged violations that oc-
curred prior to October 15, 1988.258 The court's holding implicitly echoed 
the reasoning of 3M Co.-that measuring the limitations period from 
the date of the actual violation would be consistent with the purposes 
of statutes of limitations.259 The court supported its finding first by 
distinguishing the cases that the government relied on in support of 
the continuing violation theory.26o The court maintained that the two 
primary cases the government cited, Sasser v. Administrator, EPA261 
and NCWF,262 did not address the issue of the continuing violation 
theory in the statute of limitations context.263 Rather, the Sasser court, 
according to the Telluride court, "was not concerned with whether 
the violation was continuing so as to bar the commencement of the 
statute of limitations .... The issue was not whether the EPA had 
belatedly prosecuted a stale claim but whether the EPA was author-
ized to prosecute such a claim at all."264 The Telluride court stated that 
the NCWF court was concerned only with the continuing violation 
theory for subject matter jurisdiction purposes, and not with respect 
to the statute of limitations itself.265 
In direct contrast to the government's argument, the court held 
that for purposes of § 2462, the plain language of the CW A did not 
create a continuing violation.266 Thus, the court struck down the gov-
ernment's argument asserting a continuing violation for the unper-
mitted fill. 267 The court agreed with TELCO's argument that the 
express language of sections 301 and 502(16) of the CWA268 did not 
create continuing violations but instead made the act of discharging 
a violation.269 Once the act of discharging is complete, the violation is 
258 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 408. In 3M Co. v. Browner, a TaSCA enforcement case, the court 
held that the phrase "first accrued" meant the time at which the cause of action first existed, 
and not when the violation was first discovered. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1462 (D.C. 
Cir.1994). 
259 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 408; see also 3M Co., 17 F.3d at 146~1. 
260 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 406-07. 
261 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993). 
262 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
263 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 406-07. 
264 [d. 
265 [d. at 407. 
266 [d.; see CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
267 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 407-08. 
268 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(16). 
269 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 407. 
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complete and the statutory period accrues.270 In its holding, the Tel-
luride court cited 3M Co., which stated "[b]ecause liability for the 
penalty attaches at the moment of the violation, one would expect [the 
date of the act of discharging] to be the time when the claim for the 
penalty 'first accrued."'271 According to the Telluride court, nothing in 
the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, or the pur-
poses of the CWA, "compel [led] one to depart from established prin-
ciples of statutory construction so as to read a 'continuing violation' 
into the Act."272 
In addition to finding that the statutory period accrued at the time 
of discharge, the court held that, even if the continuing violation 
theory were applicable, TELCO had committed no continuing viola-
tion.273 The court reasoned that "mere ongoing impact" from past 
violations did not suffice to extend the period in which a plaintiff can 
file an action.274 In support of its position, the Telluride court cited the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case of Ward v. 
Caulk,275 which stated that "a continuing violation is occasioned by 
continual unlawful acts, not by ill effects from an unlawful violation."276 
The Telluride court thereby implied that the existence of illegally 
discharged dredged or fill materials in wetlands constituted ill effects 
but did not, in and of itself, constitute an unlawful act.277 As a result, 
the court concluded that because TELCO was not discharging fill into 
wetlands, neither a current violation nor a continuing violation ex-
isted for statutes of limitations purposes. The court stated that "[t]he 
fact that a continuing impact exists from TELCO's past violations 
does not render the violation continuing."278 In short, the Telluride 
court held that for CWA violations, no continuing violation exists and 
thus the five-year statutory period under § 2462 accrued at the time 
of discharge.279 As a result, the government only could pursue alleged 
violations that occurred on or after October 15, 1988.280 
270 See id. 
271 Id. at 408 (quoting 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
272Id. at 407. 
273 See id. at 408. 
274 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 407, 408. 
275 650 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981). 
276 Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 407; see Ward, 650 F.2d at 1147. 
277 See Telluride, 884 F. Supp. at 407. 
278 I d. at 408. 
279 See id. 
280 See id. 
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VI. THE TELLURIDE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADOPT 
EITHER THE CONTINUING VIOLATION THEORY OR THE 
DISCOVERY RULE 
Whether the continuing violation theory or the discovery rule is the 
preferred choice for the tolling of federal statutes of limitations, the 
United States v. Telluride Co. court was incorrect in holding that the 
five-year statutory period for CWA violations began to run at the time 
the act of discharge occurred. The court erred because it failed to 
recognize that a significant period of time often elapses between the 
moment a defendant commits a wrong and the time a plaintiff discov-
ers or becomes aware of the injury.281 A wrongful tort or statutory 
violation does not necessarily give rise to an immediate injury or harm 
for which a plaintiff will be aware of the source or cause of an injury.282 
Thus, the time the statutory period accrues can be of tremendous 
concern to both an injured party and a tortfeasor, as it will determine 
not only whether or not a plaintiff has slept on his or her rights but 
also whether a defendant is liable for any "ancient obligations."283 
Specifically, significant periods of time can elapse between a viola-
tion of federal law and when the government becomes aware of the 
violation and its injurious effects.2B4 Thus, to adhere to a rule that the 
statute of limitations accrues on the date of violation, when discovery 
of the violation could be much later, is facially unfair to the complain-
ing party. 
Such a rule would be unfair in that it conflicts with the purposes of 
the CWA-to protect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the nation's waters-by preventing the government and civil envi-
ronmental groups from attaching deterrence value to the enforcement 
sections therein. Moreover, a rule like that adhered to in Telluride not 
only potentially prevents the government from litigating claims it has 
not even "slept on" -it may in fact force the government to rush into 
filing claims-but also subtly encourages fraud and concealment on 
the part of landowners and developers. Realizing that the statutory 
period will begin to run on the day of violation and not when the 
government has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation 
will motivate violators not only to conceal their violations from the 
281 Developments, supra note 14, at 1,200. 
282 [d. 
283 [d. at 1,185, 1,200. 
284 See supra section IV. 
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government and their neighbors, but also to bypass or ignore the 
entire permitting and regulatory process promulgated under the CWA. 
The rule established in Telluride will provide a violator with incentive 
to make unpermitted discharges of pollutants or dredged or fill mate-
rials into waters of the United States secretly or covertly, and to 
continue to keep those violations a secret beyond the five-year statute 
of limitations, thereby completely frustrating effective enforcement 
of the CWA. 
In short, the Telluride decision conflicts with the well-known notion 
that misrepresentation or misleading conduct often constitutes "con-
structive fraud" so as to grant the government a concealment excep-
tion to the running of the statute of limitations.285 Permitting the 
Telluride decision to remain good law not only frustrates effective 
enforcement of the CWA but also contradicts well-established princi-
ples of deterrence. 
Both the Telluride court and the United States government erred 
in their respective interpretations of the continuing violation theory 
in Telluride. In Telluride, the court held that the unlawful discharge 
of pollutants under section 301286 did not constitute a continuing vio-
lation so as to extend the period in which the government could file 
an action.287 Similarly, the EPA argued that the discharge of dredged 
or fill materials into wetlands constituted a continuing violation so 
long as the adverse effects of the illegal, unremoved fill continue.288 
Both the judge and the government, in asserting their respective 
interpretations of the continuing violation theory, however, incor-
rectly cited the NCWF289 decision. NCWF implicitly stood for the 
proposition that the presence alone of illegal fill in wetlands consti-
tuted a CWA violation, irrespective of adverse effects.290 
Under NCWF, every day illegal, unpermitted fill remains in wet-
lands constitutes a CWA violation in and of itself, distinct from the 
physical act of discharging.291 Not only is an unpermitted discharge of 
illegal fill a violation of the CWA, but the fact that the alleged violator 
chooses to let the illegal fill remain, constitutes a second CWA viola-
tion, irrespective of any harmful or ill effects or impacts resulting 
285 See supra notes 40--43 and accompanying text. 
286 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
287 United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 407-08 (D. Colo. 1995). 
288 See id. at 406. 
289 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
290 See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text. 
291 NCWF, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1943. 
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from the discharge.292 Thus, so long as illegal fill remains in wetlands 
and physically is not removed, this second violation of the CWA is a 
continuing one. This approach satisfies the requirement of United 
States v. Telluride Co. that an actual violation offederallaw presently 
exist, not merely the presence of continuing ill effects of a past act of 
violation.293 Although the first CWA violation may be both completed 
and inactionable after the five-year statutory period, the second vio-
lation remains a continuing violation until the fill physically is re-
moved. Thus the statute of limitations does not accrue for purposes 
of the second violation as the violation is of a continuing nature. 
Finally, one must consider employment of the continuing violation 
theory in section 404 cases from the perspectives of efficiency and 
consistency. The ACOE, in its role as defender of the environment, 
enforces section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899294 via the 
"continuing offense" or continuing violation theory.295 For reasons of 
uniformity, consistency, and efficiency, extending the continuing vio-
lation theory to section 404 violations appears logical. The continuing 
violation theory recently was extended to section 404 violations by 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 
United States v. Reaves.296 Because the ACOE already follows the 
continuing violation theory for one set of its enforcement matters, it 
only would be rational to enable the ACOE to employ the same 
standard for statutes of limitations purposes for other enforcement 
matters, including those brought under section 404. The Reaves opin-
ion implicitly confirms extension of the continuing violation theory to 
section 404 cases as a practical and necessary decision.297 
The Reaves case, moreover, provides support for another argu-
ment, albeit unintentionally, that supports extending the continuing 
violation theory to section 404 cases. The ACOE and the EPA will 
and do bring enforcement actions alleging both section 10 and section 
404 violations. Permitting a rule like that espoused in United States 
v. Telluride Co. would be inefficient and confusing because, as in 
292 See id. 
293 See United States v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 407-D8 (D. Colo. 1995) (citing McDougal 
v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1991) and Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 
1147 (9th Cir. 1981». Both cases cited in Telluride stand for the proposition that "mere ongoing 
impact from past violations does not extend the period in which a plaintiff must file an action." 
ld. at 407. 
294 33 U.S.C. §§ 401--67 (1994). 
295 See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text. 
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Reaves-like cases, the section 10 and section 404 violations can be 
linked inextricably to the same activity and factually indistinguish-
able from one another. To establish a rule contrary to the continuing 
violation theory may cause great inefficiency and confusion for both 
courts and litigating parties in resolving cases where section 10 and 
section 404 violations coexist, because the respective statute of limi-
tations issues will have to be bifurcated and argued separately, rather 
than dispensed with in one motion or brief. Thus, to provide the 
ACOE and the EPA with the continuing violation theory in one statu-
tory enforcement context but not the other is illogical, particularly 
since both the CWA and the Rivers and Harbors Act have a common 
design or purpose: to protect and preserve the navigable waters of 
the United States. 
In short, because courts have recognized the continuing violation 
theory for section 10 enforcement cases, so too should courts, for 
reasons of efficiency and consistency, recognize the continuing viola-
tion theory for section 404 violations. If the continuing violation the-
ory or an implicit reading of it are rejected, the discovery rule, al-
though not asserted in Telluride, should nonetheless be available to 
the federal government for section 404 CWA enforcement actions 
because of its near universal adoption by courts in other statutes of 
limitations contexts. 
Private and public plaintiffs alike have applied the discovery rule, 
and courts have recognized it in a wide variety of statutes of limita-
tions cases pertaining to a plethora of federal statutes.298 Moreover, 
some federal courts have accepted the discovery rule as a valid theory 
with which to interpret the accrual of the § 2462 statute of limitations 
for CWA enforcement actions.299 The discovery rule was applied in 
United States v. Windward Properties, Inc., a CWA enforcement 
action that included section 404 violations for the unpermitted fill of 
wetlands.300 
In short, because of its near universal application in federal statute 
of limitations matters, including other CWA violations, extending the 
discovery rule to section 404 violations seems logical. For reasons of 
uniformity, predictability, and certainty among federal courts, the 
discovery rule should be a valid doctrine for section 404 cases. Spe-
cifically, the discovery rule is a necessary doctrine for section 404 
298 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra section IV.B. 
300 See supra notes 190-211 and accompanying text. 
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violations for the reasons alluded to in Windward301 and United States 
v. Aluminum Company of America.302 
The federal government is responsible for enforcing federal laws 
with limited resources over large geographical areas.303 As a result, 
the discovery of many section 404 wetlands violations, like other CWA 
violations, can be extremely difficult.304 Most violations are difficult to 
detect because after fill operations, former wetlands often resemble 
uplands, thereby making a violation virtually invisible to the naked 
eye.305 In addition, violations are difficult to detect because, unlike 
other CWA violations where the violators themselves file a report, 
the government is not put on notice of potential violations in section 
404 matters.306 The government lacks the personnel and economic 
resources with which to police and enforce the CWA at a more favor-
able level.307 As indicated in United States v. Aluminum Company of 
America, federal agencies often are deluged with more responsibility 
and a greater duty to enforce than is feasible.30s Too much of the 
timing of a CWA enforcement action is beyond the government's 
control.309 Thus, not to provide the federal government with the ability 
to assert in court that it simply did not possess the means to reason-
ably discover the alleged violation would thwart effective enforce-
ment of the CWA.31O 
In short, courts should require a party to present some form of 
reasonable notice to satisfy the elements of the discovery rule. For 
the five-year statutory period under § 2462 to accrue, some form of 
notice must be provided to, or be reasonably attainable by, the federal 
environmental agency. Considering the difficulty the federal govern-
ment has in discovering alleged violations, some reasonable notice 
requirement, albeit a report from another federal agency or a letter 
from a local conservation commission, would place the contending 
parties on a more level playing field. 
The objective nature of the discovery rule, specifically a notice 
requirement, lends itself to section 404 enforcement actions. If the 
301 821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
302 824 F. Supp. 640 (E.D. Tex. 1993). 
303 [d. at 647. 
304 Windward, 821 F. 8upp. at 695. 
305 [d. 
306 [d. 
307 [d. 
308 ALCOA, 824 F. 8upp. at 647. 
309 See United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 919 (lst Cir. 1987). 
310 See ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. at 647. 
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government should have reasonably discovered a violation sooner, 
then the statutory period would begin to run sooner.311 The purpose 
of statutes of limitations still would be upheld by the discovery rule 
if it included this requirement. "[T]he Government can not unreason-
ably delay in bringing an action, while the public is not harmed by an 
inability to prosecute claims for violations that could not reasonably 
have been discovered."312 
It is possible that the government in United States v. Telluride Co. 
did not assert the discovery rule to combat the accrual of the statu-
tory period because the facts were unfavorable. Perhaps the govern-
ment did not dispute the facts nor assert the discovery rule because 
it realized it should have, through the use of reasonable diligence, 
discovered the sixty-acre violation of the CWA. If this is the case, the 
objectivity of the discovery rule, in light of the purposes of statutes 
of limitations, would hold: if the government has slept on its rights, it 
should lose the opportunity to litigate a stale claim. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In short, the Telluride case reminds the legal community that stat-
utes of limitations, when not accorded much weight or respect by a 
plaintiff, can carry significant legal, economic, and environmental con-
sequences. Thus, the need for a legitimate device with which to toll 
the statutory period for CWA violations is obvious. The government 
and environmental public interest groups must possess the ability to 
reasonably discover the undiscoverable if either is to succeed in pro-
tecting America's environment. The answer to this problem lies in 
either the continuing violation theory or the discovery rule. Applica-
tion of either the continuing violation theory or the discovery rule to 
toll the § 2462 five-year statutory period for CWA violations will 
enable the government not only to protect the biological, physical, and 
chemical integrity of the nation's waters by prosecuting violations 
that could not have been reasonably discovered earlier, but also will 
ensure that the future of America's wetlands will be more secure. The 
United States v. Reaves and United States v. Windward Properties, 
Inc. decisions, respectively adopting each of the above-mentioned 
doctrines, are steps in the right direction. 
311 See Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 695. 
312Id. 
